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ISSUES IN DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH: 
THE CASE OF WATER IN KENYA 
by 
Harland Padfield 
Since the application of science to policy adds a self conscious 
demension to policy, it seems appropriate that the scicntific frame work for 
this application also be self conscious. Self consciousness in science 
begins with an examination of its deductive system or its a priori system 
of logic. 
2. These are some of the philosophical issues which from my point 
of view need to be thought through before a useful water research program 
can be designed. Some of these issues have been raised explicitly or 
implicitly by others.Some I raise myself as a means of critiquing what 
appear to be fallacies or contradictions in logic of some of the state-
ments I have studied. My basic thesis for this whole discussion is this: 
if science is used in formulating policy prior to empirical studies, as 
it frequently is s the deductive propositions upon which this policy is 
based tend to predetermine the implicit hypothetical system as well as 
the explicit hypotheses for research and evaluation. This may invalidate 
or, at the very leasts minimize the effectiveness of research and 
evaluation. 
I. 3. The issue of the dynamic interrelationships of science and 
policy, or the interrelationships of science and policy at various stages 
of the planning and development process. 
4-. It seems to me water research at this stage in Kenyan Development 
begins with the acceptance of three realities: 
1) Water and systems for the use of water are 
universal. 
2) There are no data streams on these systems. 
3) A Kenyan water development policy exists and is 
becoming an operational reality. 
5. There is no such thing as an absence of water supplies or an 
absence of technologies for their use. Wherever people are located they 
will have systems for the utilization of water just as they will have 
for the use of lanl^ecology generally. In the midst of numerous and 
various existing water systems and at the stage of virtually zero know-
ledge of these systems, a national water development policy begins. 
This is the stage on which or at which a player called water research 
appears with a fistful of scenarios but no script. 
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6.Planned development must begin somewhere. If policy planners 
waited until the existing situation was empirically known to them, it 
probably would not begin since the compelling reason for knowing the 
situation would not exist were it not for policy. It is a central fact 
of development research's existence, that it is more a consequence of 
policy than a cause. 
7.This genesis commits research to the priorities of policy if 
for no other reason than the fact that policy is always one step ahead 
of it. Thus it is historically inevitable as well as morally proper, or 
should I say "economicall y necessary", that development research is 
heavily biased toward application. But the effects of this peculiar 
genesis do not end there. The effects frequently intrude into the logics 
of the research process itself. 
8.In the urgency of human needs and political necessities and to 
add redundantly, in the absence of empirical data, the initial role of 
science is to form a priori rationale. That is scientists help planners 
speculate about the situation scientifically. If the scientists are 
economists, the rationale they provide planners will be heavily biased 
in terms of production efficiencies or economic benefits over economic 
costs to a theoretical national economy. If the advisors are sociologists, 
rationale will be biased in terms of consumption or welfare effeciencies 
or social benefits over social costs to a theoretical national society. 
If the advisors should happen to be anthropologists, policy rationale 
would be biased in terms of its effects on quality of life and viability 
of a particular cultural group, society or community. 
9.Ignoring for the moment, the kind of bias in rationale , the 
problem I am stressing is that preconceived rationale developed by science 
for policy at the planning stage frequently becomes ipso facto the dedu-
ctive system for research and evaluation, especially when the same person, 
group or institution functions in both scientific capacities. The result 
is a kind of exercise in the evaluation of hypothesis making—an evaluation 
of the rationale of policy as opposed to the evaluation of policy proper. 
I cite Dennis Warner's impact study or Tanzanian rural water supplies as 
a case in point: 
The success of any investment made in the cause of 
development should be gauged in the light of the objectives 
it sets out to achieve. In the case of rural water supply , 
the intended objectives are rarely specified explicitly. j 
For the most part the intended objectives, as well as the I 
s. 
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resulting effects, are left as unspoken, implicit assumpt-
ions. The success of programmes often is measured in terms" 
of the number of people served with water per year or, more 
frequently, the amount of expenditure achieved during the 
period in question. If water supply investments are made 
for development purposes, then neither the amount of expen-
ditures nor the totals of population served, by themselves, 
should be used as measures of success or achievement. 
Success should be measured against the national development 
objectives that are related to rural water supply.... 
The impact study under the direction of the Economic 
Research Bureau started with the basic premise that the 
benefits of an improved rural water supply are those 
resulting social and economic changes that contribute to 
the fulfilment of national development objectives.-'-
Warner is confusing policy rationale with policy. The rationale for U 
policy is a thought system and usually not a very comprehensive or 
consistent one at that. "Testing1' this thought system is an intriguing 
academic exercise, but I am skeptical of its net benefits to planning. 
Policy is action. More precisely, policy is a system of action. It 
intersects systems of action participated in and generated by sets of 
people referred to as "beneficiaries". Therefore both policy and bene-
ficiary behaviour must be seen as open systems of action—open to each— 
and these systems of action must be empirically derived before the full 
effects of policy can be determined. Policy rationale or what planners 
say they are doing and why they are doing it, can only partially compre-
hend these real action systems. It is a deductive model as opposed to 
empirically abstracted models of behaviour. 
10.Scientists are naive to think that even when their hypothesis 
are incorporated in policy statements, that this is primarily due to 
their scientific validity. Policy rationalization is aimed primarily at 
the politics of acceptance and is only secondarily concerned with formu-
lating valid models of policy and beneficiary behaviour. Policy state-
ments are articles of faith appropriate to the sentiments, values and 
beliefs of the people whose support is needed. The statements may be 
couched in the values of a predominate ethnic and class group, as recent 
United States Urban slum policy is rationalized in terms of the sentiments 
and beliefs of the white middle class. In newly independent countries, 
development policies will be rationalized in terms of the objectives of 
the independence movement. If the new order is founded upon a socialist 
system of thought, propositions will be consistent with socialist ideology. 
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If it is a capitalistic social system, even the same over-all development 
objective will be rationalized a different way. Compare the Tanzanian 
2 
Water Development program with its Kenyan counterpart. When all is said 
and done, I seriously doubt the over-all effects of either policy will be 
significantly different—unless, of course, there are large differences 
in the levels of allocations. 
11.The thought system reflected in policy rationale is the result 
of forces and proceses distinct from the logics of science. This point 
would be redundant if I were talking about policy-making prior to the fad 
of hiring the scientific expert. For instance, I doubt there would be 
any tendency among policy scientists to attach serious scientific signi-
ficance to the policy utterances of Sir Philip Mitchell, Governor of 
Kenya during the wanning years of Britain's Colonial rule: 
It is common ground that the great mass of the people 
of this region (East and Central Africa) are still in a state 
of ignorance and backwardness, uncivilized, superstitious, 
economically weak to the point of near helplessness and quite 
unable to construct a civilized future for themselves, to 
'pull themselves up by their own bootstraps'. Universal 
suffrage or democratic government is unthinkable. If it were 
allowed, it would merely lead to a 'twentieth-century model' 
of the slave trade whose abolition had in the first place 
been the motivation of 'the great men who led the missionary 
venture of rescue'—the British colonization of Eastern 
Africa.3 
These statements would be dismissed summarily as the catechisms of a 
benevolent chauvinist, and it would be considered and absurd waste of 
time to scientifically test them and morally wrong to lend scientific 
as 
expertize in implementing them. To me it is just/inappropriate to frame 
testable hypotheses about the effects of water development programs in 
Kenya from policy statements of the Kenyan Government: 
...Water made available more easily and in larger 
quantities could significantly raise the level of production 
per family realizable from small farm cultivation and animal 
husbandry. The provision of rural water supplies is accor-
dingly regarded by the Government as a fundamental condition 
for rural development (italics mine),4 
Kenya's water policy, like Britain's post war colonial policy^is a result I ^ 
of the beliefs and values of the political decision makers. Like most 
policies, it is rationalized in the most acceptable terms of the day. 
Water development could just as well be rationalized on the grounds of 
maintaining political stability. The Tightness or wrongness of a policy 
is to be assessed in terms of the total effects—unintended as well as 
- 5 -
intended—not in terms of the prior justifications for it. 
12.Policy is no more autonomous than it has ever been. It still 
is a function of culture. The fact that more recently in the ancient 
history of policy making, scientists are the chief employees of policy 
makers as opposed to philosophers, priests, noblemen, generals, aristocrats, 
poets or medicine men, in no fundamental way changes the process of policy 
formation or the functions of policy. Science is simply a new stream of 
inputs into the concensus system of policy formation. The process of 
policy formation and implementation is not transformed into a scientific 
exercise by imbedding policy rationale with scientific terms and concepts. 
It is not de-biased by this consultation, it simply gets another bias—an 
important one perhaps—but a bias nevertheless. 
13.1 regard scientific fundamentalism as just another more recent 
form of absolutism, and some supremely able scientific skeptic of science 
should warn well meaning planners in developing countries about the perils 
and pitfalls of -placing an absolute value on policy being rationalised in 
terms of supposedly "objective" quantifiably verifiable criteria. This 
practice sweeps clear the old familiar people-biases putting in their 
place new biases which planners will have the expense of discovering at 
some future date. Scientific fundamentalism in policy, if anything, may 
further alienate policy from the people—although it may take a scientist 
to prove this, which would, of course., enable science to save policy from 
science thus reinforcing scientific fundamentalism. 
II 1M-.Getting down to specifics in the case of water development 
research there are a number of a priori tenets which I consider to be 
the logical consequences of scientists taking scientifically rationalised 
policy too seriously, or in other words accepting uncritically at the 
research and evaluation stage, the rationale for the policy formulation 
and acceptance stage. 
15.1)First I think there is a bias of attributing too much singular 
significance to the development of domestic rural water-supplies. Putting 
it another way, there is danger of too singular a research emphasis on 
water development impact given the present and projected levels of expen-
diture per scheme. 
16.There are some very undeistanaixle reasons for this bias. Rural 
Water Development is a very recent policy emphasis. There has been a 
dramatic increase in the budget for water. There is a paucity of basic 
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data on all aspects of water. There is considerable donor interest in 
water, specifically; and of course, physically and technically, water 
systems are distinctive. But all of these compelling reasons to think 
of water as a separate entity do not mean that rural water supplies at 
the levels projected will have economic impacts significant enough to 
justify the large costs of research to isolate them. For instance after 
somewhat arbitrarily determining from a number of "inconsistent" policy 
objectives that the general thrust of Kenya's planning strategy is first 
to raise national income as a pre-condition to meeting its social 
objectives, Carruthers goes on to say, 
If the (Kenya) water programme is to reach the high 
level of £2 million per year within three or four years, 
the programme has to be consistent with the planning 
strategy of the country of raising national income. Thus 
emphasis should be place on schemes which will produce 
large additions to the national income.5 
Thus the pivotal premise that leads to a production oriented design for 
rural water projects and an implied role for research and evaluation in 
this regard is that Kenya's projected levels of allocation for rural 
water supplies are too significant to escape the production rule. 
17.1 consider this premise false. In the first place regardless 
of the amount of money being spent, the schemes are for human consumption. 
This is dictated by the capacities of the delivery systems, relative to 
the numbers of people served. We are not talking about investment in 
technologies to convert fossil carbons, solar energy, fissionable 
materials, or even large scale irrigation schemes converting solar energy 
and arid lands into agricultural output; we are talking about systems 
for saving human energy, and under the most optimum conditions in a labor-
scarce economy where the labor saved has the opportunity of being converted 
into production on a 1 to 1 basis, the man hours and capital required to 
build and maintain delivery systems would have to be charged against the 
man hours converted from water collecting to farm labor or some other 
hand labor. Another thing to remember in this argument is that the labor 
theoretically saved is all low cost or unskilled labor, so it is implied 
that if there is any conversion at all it would be to labor intensive, 
low productivity systems, so what are we academicians talking about? We 
are debating in rather pretentious terms the tremendous increases in 
production which theoretically result from delivering 5 to 10 gallons of 
unpurified water to within a mile of an unskilled laborer's or small 
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farmer's house. I identify the beneficiary here in terms of his given 
productive capacity because the argument is about the production function 
of small scale rural water schemes. If it were agreed that the production 
function is negligible, which is what I am saying, then beneficiaries 
could appropriately be identified simply as human beings with very explicit 
and universal human needs in regard to water, and the logical foundation 
laid for a consistent clear-cut strategy for scheme selection and design. 
It is inherent in the production argument that some people or some produ-
ction roles are more valuable than others. I agree that this is true 
and argue that the logics of this premise do not lead to the implementa-
tion of 10 gallon per capita delivery systems to low skilled laborers, 
but should lead instead to the allocation of £2 million to one or two 
large scale irrigation projects or to industrial use. Obviously this is 
socially and politically intolerable while the rural population has no 
water. So in effect the production argument is not confirmed by the level 
of allocations, given the number of schemes it is supposed to finance and 
the number of people it is supposed to serve. 
18..1 have one other argument with this fixed emphasis on the " high 
level" of water allocations and the implied significance this has for 
economic cost/benefit research and evaluation. Not only does it lack 
significance as a production input, but its significance relative to 
levels of allocations in other sectors must be challenged. I address 
myself to the thinking exemplified by the following statement: 
Kenya is committing a significant proportion of its 
development budget to rural water development. Although 
it is possible that this would be continued even if economic 
benefits are not resulting, it would be better to take 
decisions in the light of facts demonstrating the impact 
of the programme.® 
The questions I ask are: "What proportion of a budget is significant?" 
and "What implications does this logic have for decision rules and research 
priorities for other programs with the same or greater proportions of the 
budget?" 
19. A ranking of programs by size of planned expenditures for 1968/ 
1969 reveals that water supplies ranks ninth out of a total of 37 programs 
(see Table 1). Health, housing I CDC, livestock, education, railways/ 
harbours, roads, and agriculture rank higher. A better index of signifi-
cance is the percentage of the development budget water accounts for, 
which is 4.04 percent. Education is double this percentage. Railways 
and harbours is two a half times, roads is almost four times and 
agriculture is five times the- planned expenditure on water. 
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TABLE 1 
Ranking of programs by size of Planned Expenditure 
for Development 1968/1959* Kf'000 
Program Am't Pet 
1. Agriculture, excluding livestock 5,842 20.80 
2. Roads 4,401 15.67 
3. Railways and Harbours 3,000 10.68 
4. Education 2,364 8.41 
5. Livestock 1,835 6.53 
6. ICDC 1,400 4.98 
7. Housing 1,200 4.27 
8. Health 1,182 4.20 
9. Water supplies 1,135 4.04 
10. Forestry 1,008 3.58 
11. DFCK 1,000 3.56 
12. Airports 525 1.86 
13. Tourism accommodation 455 1.62 
14. Government Buildings 435 1.54 
15. Local authorities 400 1.42 
16. Armed Forces 396 1.41 
17. Posts & Telecommunications 337 1.20 
18. | Prisons 203 .72 I 
20. Police 150 .53 
Out of 37 programs & K£28,078,000 




Ranking of programs by size of actual (estimated) 
Expenditure for Development 1968/1969* KjE'000 
Program Am't Pet 
1. Roads 7,385 22.53 
2. Agriculture excluding livestock 6,974 21.27 
3. Education 3,258 9.93 
4. Railways and Harbours 2,910 8.87 
5. Housing 2,000 6.10 
6. Posts & Telecommunications 1,153 3.51 
7. Health 1,150 3.50 
8. Livestock 994 3.03 
9. Forestry 975 2.97 
10. ICDC 945 2.88 
11. Government Buildings 784 2.39 
12. Water supplies 654 1.99 
13. DFCK 450 1.37 
14. Tourism accommodation 361 1.10 
15. Armed Forces 338 1.03 
16. Police 279 .85 
17. Prisons 252 .76 
18. Airports 243 .74 
V 23. Local Authorities 100 .30 
Out of 37 programs & K£32,778,000 
-Abstracted from Table 2.29, pp.52-53, Republic of Kenya, Development Plan 
1970/1974. 
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20. A look at the actual as opposed to planned expenditures for 
1968/1969 reinforces my skepticism. (see Table 2). In actual expendi-
tures 3 water ranks 12th accounting for less than two percent of the 
budget. Government buildings is 11th, health is 7th, post and tele comm-
unications 6th, housing 5th with six percent of the budget, rail and 
harbours 4th with almost nine percent, education 3rd with 10 percent and 
agriculture and roads are the giants of the budget 5 with a whopping 21 
and 23 percent respectively—over ten times the expenditure on water. 
21. How relatively significant is water ranking in twelfth place 
with less than two percent of the budget? It would seem much more impor-
tant by Carruther's logic to ascertain the economic benefits of roads, 
education, housing, the postal communications and health systems than 
water supplies. If research priorities were to be rationalized on this 
basis, actually we scientists have no business dabbling in water until 
the economic decision rules for some of these other programs are established 
—such as roads for instance. At least it would seem to a non-economist 
that an economist could take this point confidently simply on the basis 
of the hypothetical cost/benefits of research activities to the Kenyan 
Government. 
22. One final look at the projected development expenditures for 
7 
the year 1973-74 does little to enhance the relative significance of 
water expenditures. Here we are dealing with projected allocations in 
the neighbourhood of £2 million, a significant increase over £1,135,000 
in 1968/1969, but the Kenyan Government is now talking about a total 
development expenditure of £52,579,000 as opposed to £28,078,000 in 
1968/69. So water's increase is virtually zero relative to the increase 
in expenditures as a whole. It is still in ninth place accounting for 
4.47 percent of a projected budget which has almost doubled in the mean-
time. Parenthetically, I might add that roads still ranks No.l. 
23. 2) The second bias I have indirectly discussed in the context 
of the over-emphasis on water impact, but it is a sufficiently serious 
bias to merit re-emphasis in a separate discussion. That is the use of 
economic cost/benefit criteria to develop decision rules for the 
implementation of policies which are the consequences of welfare norms 
and social demands. This raises the issue of whether expenditure for 
rural water supplies is to be regarded as a production input or a l' V welfare input. Clearly Kenya policy rationale regards it as both. 
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24. There are very compelling reasons why policy statements emphasize 
the production benefits of a given program. Even though a given policy may 
be in response to demands altogether at variance with the aim of increasing 
national productivity and even though the effective system of action may be 
to increase the welfare of people, it is frequently mandatory and always 
good to throw in a set of hypothetical justifications having to do with 
increasing national income. But an unassailable justification for policy 
easily becomes the conventional proposition for research, implementation 
and evaluation, making data requirements and analytical designs as inevi-
table and predictable as-the climax of an American cowboy movie. 
25. This bias must be challenged. I take the position that the 
consumption functions of Kenya's rural water expenditures are criterial, 
not their production functions. I am not substituting welfare fundamentism 
for production fundamentism or a sociological bias for an economic one. It 
depends upon the program. Regardless of the rationale for Kenya's rural 
water program, given the limited expenditures relative to other programs, 
the policy of maximizing the number of schemes relative to these expendi-
tures, their low per capita capacities, their geographical dispersion, 
coupled with the social demand for piped water in excess of program 
commitments—all, lead me to the working premise that it is the immediate 
welfare of rural people which is at stake not agricultural production. 
All of this would be academic except for the amount of money being spent 
for research to support development. Any serious effort to make production 
benefits an operational hypothesis for water research makes research 
activities and exceedingly expensive pretension leading to the absurdity 
of expatriate research scientists with annual costs in excess of the 
capital costs of an entire water scheme doing time and motion studies 
of overworked and underemployed people before and after a small pipe 
brings water a few miles closer to their doors. This may itself be one of 
the consumption functions of water development, but I think there are more 
efficient ways of allocating this welfare benefit. 
26. Looking for large productive responses from small per capita 
capacity water schemes leads logically to certain other fallacious pre-
conceptions, one of these is the concept of "released time". This raises 
the issue of the "benefits" of labor substitution. 
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27. 3) "Released time" is a meliorative term for labor replacement. 
It is frequently a euphemism for unemployment. It is not only naive, it 
is singularly misleading because premises or a priori assumptions about 
the opportunity costs of labor as well as the cultural values and socio-
economic situation of the worker are inherent in the concept. Actually 
it is an hypothesis on the benefits of labor substitution being used as 
a ready-made proposition- for exploring the "impacts"of labor substitution. 
28. In regard to piped water, the implicit premise is that the 
people hauling water are doing so because water is a sheer necessity 
beyond price and there is no relationship between this man, woman or 
child's availability or willingness to carry water and the theoretical 
value of his labor. On the contrary, there is a direct relationship 
between the availability of the person carrying water and the value of 
his labor. If he had more productive things to do he would be doing them. 
The fact that it is water he is carrying instead of scraps of wood, empty 
wine bottles or rags in no way alters the economic implications of the 
activity. 
29. The released time hypothesis requires us to accept a proposi-
tion that there is a compelling non-economic form of activity depriving 
a valuable man of his time much the same as asthma deprives a doctor or 
an attorney of his time. If he is cured of his asthma then think of how 
many more clients he can handle and the increase in fees he can realize. 
Economic theory accounts for behaviour in this model only at the point 
that the asthma is cured or the captivity of his labor—i.e. the necessity 
to have water—is broken. At this point the victim or beneficiary is 
transformed from non-economic man to economic man putting his gift &£ free 
time to good use by engaging in activities his captivity denied him and 
the lack of performance of which had been costing him and his nation 
either in the form of low yields on his labor-constrained shamba or wage 
opportunities forgone on a hot labor market. The released time proposi-
tion is as misleading here as it is in hypothesizing the "benefits" of 
electric kitchens to uneducated American housewives, or the snow plow to 
the Eskimo, or the cotton picking machine to the Mississippi sharecropper— 
or for that matter, to the U.S. economy. 
30. The sociology and micro economics of the tasks being displaced 
are fundamental to predictions about what those performing them will do 
when ''released" from their "drugery". Basically it boils down to the 
issue of whether water hauling is an economic activity or a disease. Of 
course if it is an economic activity, we must understand the existing 
system of distribution of the benefits of the existing water supply. The 
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role or economic significance of hauling cannot be understood until its 
place in this system is known. We know there will be differentials in 
the benefits from water in an area, a community and even a household. 
The same will hold true of the benefits of the labor of hauling. It's 
the familiar question of who gets what and how much. It is axiomatic 
that the new water technology will have differential impacts on people 
in some relationship to their roles or status positions in the old system. 
31. I contend that whatever water hauling is—i.e. if it is captive 
labor—this is not a function of the existing water technology but rather 
a function of the prevailing micro economic system. This means that the 
key constraint is not the existing technology but the socio-economic 
position of the hauler. Substituting a pipe gravity system for a labor 
intensive hauling system would not benefit him except by increasing his 
leisure or idlesness in which case we can say he is better off but no 
richer—that is assuming he gets his share of the water. But one of 
the implications of water hauling as an economic activity is that there 
are others besides the hauler who benefit from his activity. Therefore 
piped water would not benefit haulers and non haulers equally because it 
brings the one who hired the hauler 10 gallons per day as well as saving 
him the cost of wages—whereas the hauler gets 10 gallons, no wages and 
leisure or open non employment. This would hold even where hauler and 
non hauler consumption were equal. But the chances are that the differen-
tials in the distribution of the benefits of the old water system will 
prevail or even widen in the distribution of benefits of the new system. 
This brings me to the discussion of a fourth bias which pervades much of 
the literature on water research and water impact studies in East Africa. 
32. 4) The concept of "areas" and the implicit assumption of area 
uniformity—i.e. the area in question lacks and internal socio-economic 
system and the articulation of its population with the larger socio-
economic system is uniform. This poses the issue of the differential 
capacities within a development area to capture the benefits of a given 
input. 
33. The concept of area produces a blind spot to the dynamics of 
impact. Typologies for development decision-making purposes should be-
by community, economic activity, or by socio-economic class, not_Jby_area. 
The integrity of any unit for purposes of generalizing about probable 
social and economic impacts is not an administrative boundary, as convenient 
as this may be. It is a function of socio-economic class. Also ethnicity 
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or language and culture plays a part, but this is a higher or more general 
criterion. 
34. There are not "poor" areas and "rich" areas or ,;'low potential" 
and "high potential". In both there will be micro strata of inequality— 
poorest, poor, less poor and less less poor—and benefits will be utilized 
accordingly. This is implicit in the definition of strata. Moreover the 
benefits of a given input will be captured unequally, many times increasing 
differentials in incpme^which-already- exist. Thus a given beneficiary 
may be better off relative to his income before the input, but worse 
off in terms of his relative socio-economic position in the local system. 
Any given area has its own exchange system for goods and services refle-
cting income differentials and other micro inequalities. Opportunities 
are perceived and rationally exploited not by an area acting in concert, 
but in terms of the smallest economic decision making unit—the household. 
This is the micro firm. Just as firms compete, households and farms 
compete for benefits. The chances are the households and the individuals 
in the households who haul the water occupy the lower strata. If this is 
so then any strategy to improve the welfare or increase the output of 
these people specifically must be more than a glib general area approach. 
Otherwise it may turn out to be an irony, meaning that water piped 
ostensibly to help the poor haulers held captive by a primitive technology 
will benefit the haulers' employers and the 5 - 1 0 acre farmer more than 
the poor haulers, who if they farm at all, probably have the smallest acre-
ages and poorest lands. This again implies that water development is 
postulated as a social good or a welfare input. 
35. A lot of issues hinge on the key issue of whether a given water 
scheme is a strategy for increasing the welfare of beneficiaries or 
increasing their production. I think and unequivocal answer to this issue 
is basic to an effective strategy. The attitude of some researchers and 
planners may be, "Why not both?" My feeling is that the national policy 
encompassing many peoples, communities, economies and regions can have 
both objectives. But at the point of specific scheme planning, I contend 
the strategy must be consistently one or the other because the strategies 
are mutually contradictory. Regardless of the rationale, the procedures 
developed spellout the operational policy. 
36. For instance the Kenyan strategy for rural water development 
is rationalized basically as a production input but then designed in such 
way as to preclude any real production gains because it is spread too thin 
i.e. to maximize the numbers of people served. So a production strategy 
is operationalised as a social good. Then planners revert once again to 
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production criteria by using potential for utilising water as a key 
selection criterion and insisting upon payment of fees because of 
projected increases in beneficiaries incomes. But then the welfare 
decision rule prevails again because there exists an effective practice 
of ignoring non payment of fees. 
— — 
37. The effective strategy which emerges from these procedures can 
be illustrated by a hypothetical case—the case of the "Mountain Ridge" 
scheme. The area was selected partly because of its high agricultural 
production which means it has a relatively wealthy stratum of farmers. 
This should have alerted planners to expect that this group would be the 
largest users of water and would have the greatest capacity for increased 
use. Moreover one would also suspect that they were paying for their 
water hauling and had the greatest capability to pay for piped water. But 
then the scheme was designed for low per capita capacity—a social good 
criterion and fee collection is not enforced—another social good decision 
rule. Individual connections are provided with no meters or any technical 
feature for regulating consumption which in effect provides the technical 
capability to capture benefits in excess of the design. 
38. The people in Mountain Ridge being human—i.e. economic man, 
the result is predicatable. A subsystem of water economics develops 
involving water shortages "pipe drouths" a black market distribution system 
and a black market pipe repair system. An enormous differential capacity 
to capture benefits results favouring of course the highest socio-economic 
stratum. The welfare aspects of the scheme have been subverted by the 
production aspects and the repayment prospects of the production aspects 
surverted by the welfare aspects. The poor haulers now have more leisure 
or obvious unemployment and must still frequently go to the river for their 
water. Larger farmers who originally had the agricultural capacity to 
utilize water in large amounts are doing so while at the same time saving 
wages previously paid haulers. What we have in effect is a welfare system 
the benefits of which are distributed in inverse proportion to the benefi-
ciaries' needs and in direct proportion to capacity to pay., 
39. Let me hasten to emphasize I am not saying this situation exists 
anywhere in Kenya, simply that it is hypothetically possible for it to 
exist given the present operational practices which, to me, seem to be 
the results of effeorts to interject the value of production fundamentalism 
into what is essentially a social demand situation. 
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III. 40. The role of social science at this stage of rural water develop-
ment in Kenya—a summary. 
41. Policy rationale and policy are two different things. The fact 
that scientists are now the chief architects of rationale makes no differ-
ence. Although this gives policy the formidable appearance of being a 
scientific process, it is in fact still a natural social action system 
including deciding which experts to hire to rationalize policy. These 
are biases which I see resulting from the confusion of macro economic 
rationale with the social, and political realities underlying Kenya's water 
policy. 1) an over emphasis on the singular importance of water development 
expenditures, 2) ignoring the sociology and micro economics of beneficiary 
populations, 3) an emphasis on production as the prime objective of water 
development, 4) and implicit reliance on cost/benefit criteria as the 
only operational index of performance. 
42. Ironically there is a real cost/benefit issue—the strategy of 
putting water expenditures into fewer, large production oriented projects 
as opposed to mounting many small projects with high beneficiary densities 
and minimal per capita capacities. But all of the indicators I see infer 
that this is a closed issued socially and politically. Regardless of its 
rationale, water development policy is an expression of peoples' felt need. 
The program will continue regardless of the lack of empirical proof of net 
income gains. This plus the low per capita inputs of the schemes and the 
level of over-all water expenditures relative to expenditures for roads, 
harbours, hospitals, schools, television and other programs where cost/ 
benefit criteria have yet to be developed; make cost/benefit studies for " 
water a trivial but expensive exercise. 
43. Does this mean there is no need for social science? I would say 
there is a need for a broad interdisciplinary social science. Since we 
are talking about a program which envisages touching literally every human 
being in Kenya by the year 2000, I would say we are talking about a human 
impact program. Modification of human systems and human behaviour is in 
involved prima facia. As with schools, hospitals and roads, the government 
should get the most effectiveness from its expenditures. There are bound 
to be production impacts, but the primary effects are the consequences in 
terms of human welfare. This is cost relevant. All behaviour is cost 
relevant. But the behaviour cannot be hypothesized without first knowing 
the sociology and micro economics of prevailing water systems. 
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What we have now in the rural areas of Kenya are human or labor 
intensive technologies for water procurement and distribution. What the 
Water Development Division is charged with doing is substituting capital 
intensive technologies in place of labor intensive. This will have social 
and economic effects —presumably beneficial. But in order to maximize 
the benefits we must do more than define impacts in terms of whole popula-
tions and areas. We must know differential impacts upon various institu-
tions and socio-economic classes and various economic activities and 
exchange systems. I am not talking about baseline surveys, I am talking 
about knowing existing water systems and interconnectedness of these 
systems with the social and economic structure of the area or population 
in question. This does not mean intensive social and micro economic 
studies of every administrative location. It would mean studying water 
systems in sociological and micro economic context in contrasting cultural 
and ecological settings. Then valid survey instruments and procedures 
could be designed for use in any area which would provide criterial 
information quickly and cheapl}7. 
45. These are some of the things I would like to know: The distri-
bution system in terms of rol«s - e.g. haulers for self and other, 
haulers for self, and employers of haulers—techniques, equipment and 
units and amounts of exchange. The existing water consumption patterns 
in terms of quality, quantity and purpose. Then the comparison of roles 
in the distribution system with levels of consumption and the comparison 
of both of these schemes for classifying people with other status systems 
—age, sex, kinship, ceremonial position, political position, economic 
position, occupation, size of farm, type of farm etc. 
46. It seems to me the theory underlying the significance of this 
information is consistent with economic theory. Given the card game 
the individual is in, and given the cards he has been dealt, he behaves 
rationally. Flanners must know the rules of the game and the various 
hands players can be dealt before they can predict or intelligently 
modify their behaviour. For instance in heavy rainfall areas like 
Central Province, where production possibilities exist for water, it 
seems likely these possibilities have long since been utilized, albeit 
via labor intensive technologies. Water is not an absolute constraint 
as in arid lands. It is an economic constraint. That means a relative 
constraint—relative in terms of what each consumer is willing to pay 
or give in exchange for it and relative in the sense that some households 
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or farms lack it more than others. In the context of all the other 
production constraints that exist for small scale agriculture in heavy 
rainfall areas, I would hypothesize there is no shortage of water, there 
is no shortage of labor, but there is shortage of money. Therefore what 
does piped water save that is crucial? It saves money, but only for 
those who were paying for their water. For those who hauled their own 
water it saves his labor, already in over supply. For the professional 
hauler it gives him water in exchange for the little money "he was getting, 
and for the water purchaser it is a direct cash savings. Hence free piped 
water to everyone in the scheme—large consumer and small consumer—i.e. 
rich and poor alike, will, in addition to bringing more leisure, increase 
existing income differentials, unless of course inversion measures were 
built into it such as a fee scale that charges higher rates in direct 
proportion to the quantity of water consumed. This of course would 
require meters. 
47. This brings me to a final pressing issue for planning—the issue of 
selection criteria. In the sense of area selection this strikes me as 
an inappropriate concept. In the sense of selection of a scheme design 
it seems meaningful. What is needed are schemes designed to be class 
specific or behaviour specific, not area specific. Thus it may be 
theoretically valid to have the same basic human organization design in 
ecologically, culturally and economically diverse areas. For instance 
correction of inequality in water benefit may be a goal. On the other 
hand certain schemes may be designed purely on the basis of economic 
demand with repayment of capital and operating costs as a prime goal. 
48. A repayment scheme might be something on the order of: 
- Water Development Division contracts to put in main lines designed for 
high per capita capacity e.g. 50 - 100 gals, per family per day. 
- all connections must be paid for by private ccT>3umers - this includes 
pipe, outlet system and meter according to standard specifications. 
- all consumers pay on basis of repayment and operating costs according 
to metered consumption. 
489. A rural welfare scheme might have the following features: 
- low per capita capacity. 
- communal points. 
- no fee structure except nominal— e.g. 7/- per year or 50 cents per 
month. 
- some form of subsidy tax on local product—milk, coffee, tea, etc—to 
repay costs. 
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- or no repayment by beneficiaries at all. 
- perhaps most important in this kind of design would be a maximum per 
capita limit on consumption. (I think this would be easier to organize 
than fee collection). 
50. The problem of the priority by which administrative areas receive 
piped water is not a scientific question but a 'politico-administrative 
question. The kinds of data which would seem appropriate to feed into 
the decision making process are basic hydrological, demographic and cost 
data. Admittedly these data may be lacking in which case it would seem 
to be a matter of choosing tentative areas, then WDD (Water Development 
Division) developing more data from survey research for final sslection. 
Data would be generated to substantiate three sets of criteria—need, 
social stability and cost. 
1) need criteria: 
- population size, nos. served per unit of expenditure. 
- existing water system and where it fits in a typology of 
water systems. 
- natural hydrology of area: sources, quantity and 
quality of water. 
- water technologies: distances, gathering and 
distribution, approximate consumption per household. 
2) social stability criteria—felt need for water in relation 
to means for water: 
enumeration and description of activities to promote 
improved water systems. 
expectations or aspirations for water obtained by means 
of a standardized semantic differential. 
3) Cost criteria—estimates of costs of different types of 
schemes for the area. 
All criterial data for the areas WDD has to choose among would be cross 
compared for final selection. Criterial data for appropriate scheme 
selection could be gathered at the same time. 
51. Whether this research is performed by WDD or IDS (Institute for 
Development Studies) is not really important. What is important from my 
point of view is for research designs to assign central significance to 
the welfare effects of rural water development and recognize the sociology 
and micro economics of existing water systems as opposed to measuring, or 
worse still, hypothesizing differences in aggregate income effects of this 
or that scheme. 
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